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In I9_;5 Congress charted the course of this nation's labor policy by pass-
ing the Wagner Act. This Act declared that workers have the right to
unionize, to engage in collective bargaining, and to be free from unfair labor
practices. Sadly, after 43 years, the promise of the Wagner Act remains a
hollow one for millions of Americans. Experience has proven that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, in its present form, contains fatal defects which
prevent the policies of the Act from being fully brought to life. Built-in delay,
inadequate remedies, and other weaknesses have thwarted the protections os-
tensibly provided by the NLRA. Indeed, the Act has become a snare and a
delusion. Workers seeking to exercise their rights under the Act have been
victimized by firings and other employer unfair labor practices. For thousands
of workers, the freedom and security promised by our labor laws have been
replaced by fear, insecurity, and deprivation.
The labor reform bills, as passed by the House of Representatives and
filibustered to death by the Senate, contained several of the improvements
most needed in the Act. The bills were designed to ensure that the rights
already contained in the NLRA would be enforced through both prompt and
fair procedures, and adequate remedies for violations of the Act. Now, after
the great filibuster, we are back to where we started. But labor law reform is
not dead. The fundamental issues raised by the congressional debates remain
for future solution. I believe that three issues which Mr. Kramer and I have
chosen to discuss—equal access, injunctive relief, and the make-whole
remedy—along with a number of other issues will continue to inspire sharp
debate until resolved by a new labor reform bill.
I. EQUAL ACCESS
There is nothing novel in the suggestion that employees have a right
to effective access to the message of union organizers. As recently as this past
term, the Supreme Court, in Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB,' confirmed
that the right to self-organization protected by section 7 of the Act depends
on the correlative right to effective access to union information.' However,
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	 , 98 S. Ct. 2463 (197H).
2 The Beth Israel Court maintained that the Supreme Court has
long accepted the Board's view that the right of employees to self-organize
and bargain collectively established by § 7 of the NLRA ... necessarily
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while the Board and the courts have recognized the importance of access in
the abstract, they have severely limited the ability of unions to carry their
message effectively to employees. In a series of decisions, unions have been
deprived of the most meaningful channels of communication on the basis of
mistaken assumptions concerning the availability of alternative channels of
communication.
The process of erosion began in 1956 with the Supreme Court's decision
in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co." There, the Supreme Court., which in Re-
public Aviation Corp. v. NLRB had upheld the right of employees to distribute
union literature on company property,' refused to adopt the same approach
with respect. to distribution by nonemployee union organizers. The basic legal
principles enunciated in Babcock & Wilcox were sound. -Hie Court, recognizing
that the right to organize necessarily gives rise to a right to learn about a
union from nonemployee organizers," held that solicitation by organizers
could be prohibited by an employer only if reasonable efforts by the Union
through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the
employees with its message ...." 7 Yet, the Court proceeded to drain that.
statement. of meaning by assuming, without empirical support, that other
available channels should be adequate to enable a union to reach employees
with its message in virtually every instance, except where employees are inac-
cessible due to the location of a plant and the living quarters of employees!'
Based on this assumption, the Court, with reference in general and uncritical
terms to "[t]he usual methods of imparting information," and "[t]he various
instruments of publicity,"" found alternative channels of communication to be
adequate in Babcock & Wilcox.
Notably absent in Babcock & Wilcox was any attempt to appraise the extent
to which alternative channels of communication actually enabled the union to
encompasses the right effectively to communicate with one another regard-
ing self-organization at the johsite."
9. ... [Section 7] organization rights are not viable in a vacuum; their
effectiveness depends in some measure on the ability of employees to
learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization from others.
Early in the history of the administration of the Act the Board recog-
nized the importance of freedom of communication to the free exer-
cise of organization rights.
98 S. Ct.. at 2469 & n.9 (1978) (quoting Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539,
542-43 (1972)).
' 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
324 U.S. 793 (1915).
Id. at 805. This right is limited, however, to oral solicitation during non-
working lime, and distribution of literature during nonworking- time in nonworking
areas, See Beth Israel, 98 S. Ct. at 2469 & 11,10. An employer can overcome these solici-
tation and distribution privileges "by a showing of special circumstances which make [a
restriction] necessary to maintain production or discipline." /d. at 2469,
" 35] U.S. at 113.
Id. at 112.
at 113.
" Id. See also id. at 107
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reach employees in a meaningful and effective manner. Thus, while the Court
claimed to he striking a balance between property rights and organizational
rights in Babcock & Wilcox,'" it. did so without considering the actual impact its
ruling would have upon organizational rights. In several cases since Babcock &
Wilcox, unions have convincingly denu.mstrated the ineffectiveness of alterna-
tive channels of communication, but have nevertheless been denied access to
the workplace." Following the Supreme Court's lead in Babcock & Wilcox, the
courts generally have denied access to the workplace" except where the
workplace is isolated and remote," or where employer unfair labor practices
can only be remedied by a grant. of access."
In Babcock & Wilcox, the Court did not have occasion to discuss what
access rights should be available to employees and. nonemployee organizers
when the employer is waging a campaign against unionization. Rather, Babcock
& Wilcox addressed the issue of no-solicitation rules as a general proposition,
without considering the relevance of antiunion speeches by an employer. The
availability of access rights during an employer's antiunionization campaign
was first addressed by the Board in 1 951 in the Boowil Teller case. 15 The
" /t/. at 112.
" I or example, compare in the following cases the decisions of the Board
granting access and the subsequent decisions of the circuit courts denying access:
NLRB v. Sioux City and New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 472 F.2d 753, 82 L.R.R.M.
2488 (8111 Cir. 1973), denying enf. of 193 N.L.R.B. 382, 78 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1971); Cen-
tral Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 252, 81 L.R.R.M. 2468 (8th Cir. 1972), denying
of. of 181 N.L.R.B. 491, 73 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1970); NLRB v. New Pines, Inc., 468 F.2d
427, 81 L.R.R.M. 2423 (2d Cir. 1972), denying of of 191 N.L.R.B. 944, 77 L.R.R.M.
1543 (1971); NLRB v. Tamiment, Inc., 451 F.2d 794, 78 L.R.R.M. 2726 (3d Cir.
1971), denying enf. if 180 N.L.R.B. 1074, 73 L.R.R.M. 1280 (1970); NLRB v. Kutshers
Hotel and Country Club, Inc., 427 F.2d 200, 74 L.R.R.M. 2394 (2d Cir. 1970), denying
eq.: if 175 N.L.R.B. 1114, 70 L.R.R.M. 1604 (1969). See also Falk Corp., 192 N.L.R.B.
716, 77 L.R.R.M. 1916, 1922 (1971) (Member Brown, dissenting).
' 2 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San -Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 205 & n.41 (1978).
13 E.g., NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d 26, 29-30, 64 L.R.R.M.
2295, 2298 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147, 152,
21 L.R.R.M. 2707, 2711 (6th Cir. 1948).
' 4 E.g., NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 81 L.R.R.M. 2285, 2287 (2d Cir. 1972)
(contempt order); NLRB v. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., 437 F.2d 290, 294,
76 L.R.R.M. 2236, 2239 (5th Cir. 1971); L.oray Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 557, 559, 74
L.R.R.M. 1513, 1518 (1970); Marlene Industries Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 703, 705, 65
L.R.R.M. 1626, 1631-32 (1967), enforced (is modified sub nom. Decaturville Sportswear v.
NLRB, 406 F.2d 886, 889, 70 L.R.R.M. 2472, 2474 (6th Cir. 1969); lUE v. NLRB, 383
F.2d 230, 232 n.4, 66 L.R.R.M. 2081, 2082 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
15
 Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 28 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1951), elf. denied,
197 F.2d 640, 30 L.R.R.M. 2305 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953). Prior
to &moil Teller, the Board had held that a "captive audience" speech by an employer is
per se unlawful. Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 805, 18 L.R.R.M. 1360, 1361
(1946). The Second Circuit disagreed, however, in NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d
373, 376, 20 L.R.R.M. 2436, 2438 (2d C:ir. 1947), as did Congress in enacting § 8(c) of
the National Labor Relations Act. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976). See Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578, 22
L.R.R.M. 1057, 11)58 (1948). Nevertheless, while rejecting a per se ban on captive au-
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Board held that "an employer who chooses to use his premises to assemble his
employees and speak against a union may not deny that union's reasonable
request. for the same opportunity to present its case, where the circumstances
are such that only by granting such request will the employees have a reason-
able opportunity to hear both sides." The Board based its ruling on the
principle "that the right of employees, guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act,
freely to select or reject representation by a labor organization necessarily en-
compasses the right to hear both sides of the story under circumstances which
reasonably approximate equality." ' 7
Two years later, the Board, with newly appointed members, overruled
Bonwit Teller in Livingston Shirt Corp.'" Like the Supreme Court's decision in
Babcock & Wilcox, the Board's decision in Livings-ton Shirt rested on broad, un-
supported assumptions as to the effectiveness of alternative routes of com-
munication." The Board said:
We do not believe that unions will be unduly hindered in their right
to carry on organizational activities by our refusal to open up to
them the employer's premises for group meetings, particularly since
this is an area from which they have traditionally been excluded, and
there remains open to them all the customary means for com-
municating with employees. These include individual contact with
employees on the employer's premises outside working hours ...
solicitation while entering and leaving the premises,,at their homes,
and at union meetings. These are time-honored and traditional
means by which unions have conducted their organizational cam-
paigns, and experience shows that they are fully adequate to ac-
complish unionization and accord employees their rights under the
Act to freely choose a bargaining agent. 2°
Still, the Board provided no details of the "experience" to which it.
referred—and which had led it to a contrary result, only two years earlier.
An issue closely related to the "right. of reply" issue of Livingston Shirt
reached the Supreme Court five years later in NLRB v. United Steelworkers
(NuTone, Inc.). 21 in NuTone, the Supreme Court considered the issue
whether an employer may enforce a concededly valid no-solicitation rule while
himself engaging in antiunion solicitation. 22 The Court refused to "rule that.
thence speeches, neither the Second Circuit in Clark nor Congress in enacting 8(c)
ruled Out a requirement of equal access if captive audience speeches are made. See
Bonwit Teller, 96. N.L.R.B. at 614 n,12, 28 L.R.R.M. at 1549 n.12.
' 6 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 612, 28 L.R.R.M, 1547, 1548.
" Id.
'" 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 33 L.R,R.M. 1156 (1953).
" See id. at 406-08, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1158-59.
2° Id. at 406, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1158 (emphasis added).
21
 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
22
 The Board had answered this question in the negative as an alternate hold-
ing in Bonwit Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 611-12, 28 L.R.R.M. 1547, 1548 (1951), but then
reversed its position in Livingston Shirt, 107 N.L.R.B. at 409, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1159. In
the two cases consolidated for review by the Supreme Court. in NuTone, the Board had
held that the enforcement of a no-solicitation rule constituted an unfair labor practice
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the coincidence of these circumstances necessarily violates the Act,, regardless
of the way in which the particular controversy arose or whether the
employer's conduct 10 any considerable degree created an imbalance in the
opportunities fbr organizational communication."'
A critical element. of the Court's analysis in NuTime was that the unions
involved had made no attempt to show that the no-solicitation rules actually
diminished their ability to reach the employees. 24 As in Babcock & Wilcox, the
Court did recognize that effective communication is central to the realization
of section 7 rights. Indeed, the NuTone Court went even further and stated
that section 7 mandates not only effective communication, but "opportunities
for effectively reaching the employees with a pro-union message ... at least as
great as the employer's ability to promote ... his anti-union views .... "25
While recognizing the principle of equal access, the Court. nonetheless held
the Board could not conclude that the enforcement. of a no-solicitation rule,
combined with antiunion solicitation, necessarily violates the principle of equal
access without pointing to "some basis, in the actualities of industrial relations,
for such a finding." 2"
In view of the conceptual framework of NuTone—a recognition of the
principle of equal access, coupled with a requirement that the principle be
applied in light of the "actualities of industrial relations"—one might have
expected the Board to reconsider the fabric of its rules on equal access. In
particular, one might. have expected a review of the Livingston Shirt ruling that
unions have no right to reply to a captive audience speech. The Livingston
Shirt ruling seemed especially open to question after NuTone since, as we have
seen, the Board's decision in that case was based on a perfunctory analysis of
alternative channels of communication, completely ignoring any real consider-
ation of "industrial realities." Yet, when the labor movement made a major
effort,. in the 1966 General Electric Co. case,' to persuade the Board to over-
rule Livingston Shirt and to return to the Bonwit Teller doctrine, the Board
refused to reconsider its position. •
The General Electric Board based its refusal to reconsider Livingston Shirt
in large part on the Excelsior rule, 28 promulgated the same day General Electric
.was handed clown. The Excelsior rule requires employers to furnish unions
if, and only if, the enfiwcement. of the rule resulted front an antiunion animus man-
ifested by other unfair labor practices committed by the employer in the course of' the
organizing campaign. Avondale Mills, 115 N.L.R.B. 840, 842-43 & tin, 8 9, 37
L.R.R.N1. 1423, 1424 & nn.8 & — (1956), enforced in part, 242 F.2d 669, 39 L.R.R.M.
2626 (5th Cir. 1957), red, 357 U.S. 357 (1958): NuTone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 36
L.R.R.M. 1165 (1955), enforced as modified, 243 F.2d 593, 39 I..R.R.M. 2103 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
23 357 U.S. at 362.
at 363.
25
 Id. at 364 (emphasis added). Similarly, the NuTone Court stated that "an
imbalance in the opportunities for organizational communication" would give rise to a
violation of the 'Act. Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
2" Id. at 364.
27 156 N.L.R.B. 1247, 61 L.R.R.M. 1222 (1966).'
28 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61	 1217 (1966).
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with the names and addresses of all eligible voters prior to a representation
election." Significantly, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,'"
upheld the substantive validity of the Excelsior rule specifically on the basis of
equal access principles."' The Court held that requiring employers to dis-
close the names of eligible voters furthers the objective of fair and free choice
of bargaining representatives "by encouraging an informed employee elector-
ate and by allowing unions the right of access to employees that management
already possesses." "2
 In refusing to overrule Livingston Shirt, the General Elec-
tric Board stressed the increased opportunities for employee access to union
communication which should result from Excelsior, while admitting that the
Board had "no experience" from which to assess how the Excelsior rule would
contribute to meaningful access rights."" Yet, in the years which have passed
since General Electric and Excelsior, the Board has failed to reevaluate the effi-
cacy of its equal access rules.
Thus, the thirty year history of litigation concerning rights of access for
employees and organizers reveals that the limitations on those rights have
stemmed not from the requirements of the Act, but from unfounded assump-
tions as to the effectiveness of alternative channels of communication. While
the Babcock & Wilcox Court recognized the right of employees to receive the
message of non-employee organizers, the Court assumed, without empirical
evidence, that the "usual methods of imparting information" normally would
enable a union to get its message through. In NuTone, and again in Wyman-
Gordon, the Court explicitly recognized the right of employees not only to
effective  communication from organizers, but also to opportunities for com-
munication at least as great as the employer's opportunity to convey his oppos-
ing view. Nevertheless, the NuTone Court concluded that the Board had failed
to show, in "the actualities of industrial relations," that an imbalance of oppor-
tunities for communication necessarily results when an employer enforces a
no-solicitation rule while himself' engaging in an antiunion campaign. In
Livingston Shirt, the Board rejected a right to reply to "captive audience"
speeches, again on the basis of unsupported conclusions as to the effectiveness
of "time-honored and traditional" means of union campaigning. Finally, in
General Electric, the Board refused to reassess its equal access rules primarily
on the untested hypothesis that the Excelsior rule might adequately improve
the potential ability of organizers to reach employees. Thus, on the basis of
faulty and outdated assumptions, the communication rights of employees and
organizers today remain greatly restricted. An unjustifiable imbalance exists
between the channels of communication which are open to employers and
those which are available to employees and unions, particularly since
employers are permitted to make "captive audience" antiunion speeches on
2 " Id. al 1236-37, 61 L.R.R.N1. at 1218.
"" 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
31 Id. at 767.
32 Id.




company time and on company premises, without granting the union an op-
portunity to reply."
Whatever may have been the state of knowledge regarding the "actualities
of industrial relations" at the time the various decisions of the Board and the
Supreme Court were rendered, it is apparent today that the existing rules of
law give employers an overwhelming advantage over unions in conveying
their views to employees. The research study published in 1976 by Professors
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman proves this point beyond question. 35 The
empirical data collected by the authors demonstrates that employers who
utilize working time and work premises for antiunion campaigns, while deny-
ing similar channels of communication to unions, contact a substantially
greater proportion of employees than do unions."
Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman found that an employer's ad-
vantage in a representation campaign stems primarily from a strong correla-
tion between campaign familiarity and attendance at meetings. The study
demonstrated that "[e]mployees who attended meetings conducted by either
party were significantly more familiar with that party's campaign than
employees who did not attend meetings." 37 Significantly, the authors also
found that employers are generally far more successful in attracting
employees to meetings scheduled during working time on work premises than
unions are in attracting employees to meetings scheduled after working hours
away from work premises." Eighty-three percent of the employees in the
research sample attended company meetings, while only thirty-six percent at-
tended union meetings." In addition, the study showed that since employees
attending union meetings tend to be union supporters, employers have a sub-
stantial advantage in communicating. with undecided employees. This advan-
tage is particularly important because, as the research demonstrated, "atten-
dance at union meetings is significantly related to switching to the union." 40
34
 Indeed, an employer, even while making captive audience speeches, nor-
mally can exclude nonemployee organizers from the plant altogether. See text at notes
3-9 supra. Only in certain narrow categories of cases must an employer who makes
antiunion, captive audience speeches grant a union's request to reply. One such in-
stance is where the employer has an unlawful no-solicitation rule—for example, a rule
prohibiting solicitation by employees on nonworking time. Another instance is where
the employer has a no-solicitation rule which, while lawful, is of a particularly broad
nature such as the Board has permitted in certain special circumstances—for example,
a rule prohibiting union solicitation during nonworking time in areas of a retail de-
partment store open to the public. See, e.g., General Electric Co., 157 N.L.R.B. at 1250,
61 L.R.R.M. at 1223. In addition, it should be noted that the Board has outlawed
captive audience speeches on company time—whether by the employer or by the
union—within the twenty-four hour period prior to an election. Peerless Plywood Co.,
107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429, 33 L.R.R.M. 1151, 1152 (1953).
35 J. GETMAN, S. COMM.:RC; & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAW AND REALITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as GETMAN].
36 See GETMAN, supra note 35, at 156-57.
37 Id. at 156.
:Is Id .
39 Id.
4" Id. at 156-57.
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Accordingly, the study concluded that union communication with undecided
employees could substantially improve union performance in elections.'"
Based on their research, Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman called
for legislation to remedy the disparity in opportunities for communication.
In testimony before the Labor Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Human Resources, the professors supported legislation providing for in-
creased union access to employees when employers use working time or work
premises for antiunion campaigns. 42 Professor Goldberg testified that:
Our data shows quite plainly that the employer who conducts cam-
paign meetings on working time or premises has a substantial advan-
tage over the union in communicating with employees. Many
employees know little or nothing about unions prior to the union
organizing campaign, and have neither the time, energy nor inclina-
tion to travel to a union meeting at the end of their working day. If
these employees are to make a free and informed choice with respect
to unionization, a choice based on hearing both sides of the unioni-
zation question, the union must have an opportunity to communicate
with them under the same circumstances as the employers.'"
The Getman, Goldberg, and Herman study confirms what many observ-
ers have long believed—that the assumptions regarding alternative means of
communication which underlie decisions such as Babock & Wilcox and
Livingston Shirt have no basis in reality." Indeed, the "actualities of industrial
relations" are that the existing rules stifle unions in their efforts to convey
their message to employees in an organizing campaign. This imbalance be-
tween unions and employers regarding opportunities for communication is
contrary to the principles enunciated by 'the Supreme Court, particularly in
41
 Id. at 157.
" S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1978) (testimony of Professor
Goldberg).
43 Id.
44 This point was well put by Judge Clark in NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp.,
324 F.2d 128, 54 L.R.R.M. 2492 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 951 (1964). Judge
Clark stated:
The chances are negligible that alternatives equivalent to solicitation in the
plant itself would exist. In the plant the entire work force may be con-
tacted by a relatively small number of employees with little expense. The
solicitors have the opportunity for personal confrontation, so that they can
present their message with maximum persuasiveness. In contrast, the pre-
dictable alternatives bear without exception the flaws of greater expense
and effort, and a lower degree of effectiveness. Mailed material would be
typically lost in the daily flood of printed matter which passes with little
impact from mailbox to wastebasket. Television and radio appeals, where
not precluded entirely by cost, would suffer from competition with the
family's favorite programs and at best would not compare with personal
solicitation. Newspaper advertisements are subject to similar objections.
Sidewalks and street corners are subject to the vicissitudes of climate and
often force solicitation at awkward times, as when employees are hurrying
to or from work.
324 F.2d at 130, 54 L.R.R.M. at 2495-96.
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NuTone and in Wyman-Gordon, and it frustrates the NLRA's objective of an
informed employee electorate." 45
 This imbalance must be corrected.
The necessary step, in my view, is legislation requiring that where an
employer communicates with employees concerning unionization on company
time or on company premises, the union seeking to organize the workplace
must be granted the opportunity to communicate with an equivalent group of
employees for an equivalent period of time and in an equivalent manner. 4 "
The details of such a statutory provision could take many forms. It. is not my
purpose to debate those details here, or to choose among the various "equal
access" proposals advanced in the last session of Congress." As Mr. Kramer's
article indicates," while the legislative debates revolved in part around the
details of an equal access rule, the basic concept of such a rule continues to
engender opposition. Once the concept is accepted, as I believe it must be, the
details of the legislation will not pose insurmountable problems.
A rule granting unions equal access to employees following employer
communication during working time or at the workplace would be relatively
modest. compared with other possible approaches. One alternative is that
Congress allow unions to have access to employees even where an employer
has not engaged in antiunion communication. Another alternative is that
Congress reinstate the Board's original rule barring employer "captive audi-
ence" speeches altogether:1" I am convinced, from the experiences recounted
by union organizers, that such speeches are inherently coercive. The very act.
of calling employees together for a captive audience speech is a demonstration
of the employer's power, and is seen as a show of force by employees. The
content of such speeches generally reinforces the coercive impact of the Occa-
sion. Even if the employer does not in so many words cross the rather tenu-
ous line drawn between lawful speech anti unlawful threats or promises,'" he
generally comes as close to the line as possible. Moreover, it is often extremely
difficult to assess the true meaning and effect of the nuances of a captive
audience speech on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, there is much to be said
for a rule—such as the Board originally adopted in 1946 51 —which would
replace that approach with a complete ban on captive audience speeches.
" NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767 (1969).
4" For example, if an employer utilizes company premises in his antiunion
campaign, the union likewise woukl he entitled io utilize company' premises.
" H.R: 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 123 CONG. REC. H 10632-48 (daily ed.
Oct. 5, 1977); S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, 124 Cora.. REC. 57526 (daily ed. May
16, 1978). The full text of the equal access provisions of H.R. 8410 and S. 2467 may
be found at Kramer, supra this issue, note 2.
48 See Kramer, Ni1Prli this issue, text and notes at 22-26.
4" See note 15 supra.
5" See generally NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-20 (1969);
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1964).
•1
 Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 81)5. 18 L.R.R.M. 1360, 1361 (1946), en-
forced, 163 F.2d 373, 20 L.R.R.M. 2436 (2d Cir. 1947); see note 15 supra. Such a rule
would not violate § 8(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976), or the first amendment,
because the rule would be based on the coercive nature of captive audience speeches
and their tendency to interfere with employee free choice. As the Supreme Court
stated in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969):
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In contrast to the two alternatives just stated, the equal access
principle—by permitting captive audience speeches and by granting unions
access rights only after the employer has himself addressed employees—
presents a more narrow proposal. Nor are there any constitutional impedi-
ments to this proposal. Although the Supreme Court's decisions in this area
have spoken, as Mr. Kramer notes," of the need to strike a balance between
property rights and the right to organize, the Court has regarded such a bal-
ance as required by the Congress, not by the Constitution. Babcock & Wilcox
and the subsequent cases turn on what "[t]he Act requires,"" not on what the
Constitution requires. If Congress were to require equal access, nothing in
Babcock & Wilcox or its progeny presents a constitutional problem. I ndeed,
Babcock & Wilcox itself, as well as all the other cases in this area,'" stand for
the proposition that property rights must yield to organizational rights to the
extent required by Congress. As Chief Justice Warren wrote, "[Olen a choice
has been required between an employer's rights in his premises and the rights
that Congress has protected under Section 7, this Court has not hesitated to
give effect to the congressional will."" As the Supreme Court has properly
observed, "[i]nconvenience, or even some dislocation of property rights, may
be necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining.""
Furthermore, the notion that Congress is somehow required to strike a
precise balance between judicially defined property rights and organizational
rights would revive the substantive due process doctrine, long ago laid to rest
in the area of social legislation.`' 7 The Constitution does not require Congress
to balance an interest it wishes to promote against the property interest of
employers. Rather, the familiar rule is that the Constitution requires only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought
to be attained." 58
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course,
must he made in the context of its labor relations setting. "rims, an
employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to
associate freely, as those rights are embodied in § 7 and protected by §
8(a)(1) and the proviso to § 8(c). And any balancing of those rights must
take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their
employers, and the necessary tendency of the fo rmer, because of that rela-
tionship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might he more
readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.
395 U.S. at 617. Indeed, even outside the employment context, speech "imposied]
upon a captive audience" may be subjected to restraints not otherwise permitted by the
first amendment. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
52
 Kramer, supra this issue, text at note 4.
53 351 U.S. at 113-14.
' See Beth Israel, 98 S. Ct. at 2475; Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522
(1976).
" NuTone, 357 U.S. at 369 (Warren, C4., dissenting and concurring).
" NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226, 232 (1949) (quoting Republic
Aviation, 324 U.S. 793, 802 n.8 (1945)).
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
" Id, at 525. This standard has been applied repeatedly in labor cases. E.g.,
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 18-19 (1976); Day-Brite Light-
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The California Supreme Court recently recognized this principle in sus-
taming an equal access rule promulgated by the California Agricultural Labor
Relations Board.''" Congress should follow California's lead. 6 " Our contem-
porary understanding of the realities of the representation election process
leaves no doubt that, without an equal access rule, employees will continue in
far too many cases to hear only one side of the issues regarding unionization.
Where only one side can be heard, a free and fair choice is impossible. The
matter is really that simple.
ing, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952); Lincoln led. Labor Union v. North-
western Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S 525, 536-37 (1949); West Coast Flow! v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937).
59 Agricultural Labor Relations Board v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 16
Cal. 3d 392, 546 P.2d 687, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183, 91 L.R.R.M. 2657, appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 802 (1976). Mr. Kramer attempts to limit Tulare by stating that the California
ALRB's rule was based on "factual findings" and contained several restrictions on union
access. Kramer, supra this issue, text at notes 39-41. But the Tulare court referred
to the "factual findings" only in considering whether the board had complied with
its statutory obligation to follow NLRA precedents. 16 Cal. 3d at 411-19, 546 P.2d at
699-705, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 195-201, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2664-69. The court did not discuss
the "findings" in considering the constitutional question. Id. at 402-11, 546 P.2d at
693-99, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 189-95, 91 L.R. R. M. at 2659-64. Indeed, the court quite
properly held that the Constitution does not require factual findings of the need for
access in a particular case before an access rule may be applied. In so doing, the court
stated:
The principal objection ... to the board's decision ... is that there will
be individual instances in which access might in fact have been unnecessary
in order to effectively communicate with the workers. This is inevitable, as
the board candidly recognizes. But it. does not follow therefrom that the
regulation is unconstitutional. "In the area of economics and social welfare,
a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some
`reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the
classification is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality.' [Citation] 'The problems of government are
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations—illogical, it may be, and unscientific.'" (Dandridge v. Wil-
liams (1970) 397 U.S. 471, 485 ....) Moreover, "a classification that meets
the test articulated in Dandridge is perforce consistent with the due process
requirement of the Fifth Amendment." (Richardson v. Belcher (1971) 404
U.S. 78, 81  
Id. at 410, 546 P.2d at 699, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 195, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2664. As for the
"restrictions" contained in the ALRB access rule, one need only read the rule, Kramer,
supra this issue, note 37, to note its great breadth. For example, the rule provides
unions a right to address employees even if the employer has not done so.
"" There could be no First amendment objection to an equal access rule. Mr.
Kramer attempts 10 formulate such an objection on the basis of Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), in which the Court struck down a Florida
statute requiring newspapers to give a political candidate an opportunity to reply in
print to criticism of the candidate by the newspaper. The issue in Tarnillo was whether-
the state could compel "editors or publishers to publish that which 'reason' tells them
should not he published." Id. at 256. The Court concluded that this would constitute
an "i ntrusion into the function of editors." Id. at 258.
The Supreme Court. has often emphasized the first amendment protection of
"editorial judgment," Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
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II. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In 1932 Congress declared in the Norris-LaGuardia Act 6 ' that "[li]a
court of the United States ... shall have jurisdiction to issue any ... injunc-
tion in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute ...." 62 The events
leading up to passage of the Act are well known." Prior to Norris-
LaGuardia, courts attempted to define the "allowable area of economic con-
flict" between labor and management 64 through application of both the
Sherman Act 65 and the common law." Judicial intervention in labor dis-
putes, primarily through the device of injunctive relief, came to be regarded
as intolerable.
Central to the outcry against "government by injunction" unquestionably
was the perception that judicial involvement in labor disputes served only to
benefit management at the expense of labor. Judges hostile to the nascent
labor movement issued injunctions clamping a lid on virtually every form of
collective action by employees, thereby severely interfering with union or-
ganizing efforts." As the Supreme Court put it in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770: 66 "In the early part of this century, the federal courts gener-
ally were regarded as allies of management in its attempt to prevent the or-
ganization and strengthening of labor unions; and in this industrial struggle
the injunction became a potent weapon that was wielded against the activities
of labor groups." 69 In light of the poor record of the courts in the early
413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973), and has stated that "[nor better or worse, editing is what
editors are for." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973). Thus,
the Tornillo ruling with respect to newspapers and political candidates cannot automat-
ically be extended to other contexts. Indeed, Tornillo does not even apply to the broad-
cast media. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969); FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, U.S. , 98 S. Ct..3026, 3040 (1978).
The question of "reply rights" in the context of a union organizing campaign can
readily be distinguished from Tornillo on two bases. First, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that because of "the economic dependence of employees on their employers,"
speech by employers is subject to special restraints necessary in order to effectuate the
policies of the NLRA. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969). Sec-
ond, on the same day that Tornillo was decided, the Court held that speech to a "cap-
tive audience" is likewise subject to restraints which would not otherwise be permissi-
ble. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 320 (1974).
6 ' Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (now codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)).
62 29 U.S.C, § 101 (1976).
63 See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE:, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930)
[hereinafter cited as FRANKFURTER & GREENE].
64 The phrase is that of Judge Pound in Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259
N.Y. 405, 412, 182 N.E. 63, 66 (1932).
63 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)). E.g.,
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927);
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
66 E.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
67 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1970).
66 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
6" Id. at 250.
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labor cases, Congress understandably reached the conclusion that courts were
institutionally ill-suited to fashion labor policy, and that the task of developing
national labor policy should be assumed by the legislature rather than by the
judiciary.'
Norris-LaGuardia was based, however, on more than a desire to curb the
predelictions of biased judges or to prevent judicial interference with organiz-
ing efforts. More fundamentally, in enacting Norris-LaGuardia Congress
sought "to prevent the injunctions of the federal courts from upsetting the
natural interplay of the competing economic forces of labor and capital." 7 ' In
the years leading up to the passage of Norris-LaGuardia, leading critics of the
misuse of the labor injunction expounded the view that labor disputes consti-
tuted a form of economic competition which should be kept free of gov-
ernmental interference." In enacting Norris-LaGuardia, Congress adopted
this view." Thus, the basic premise of the Act is that labor disputes should
be resolved through the exercise of the economic power at the disposal of the
contending parties, rather than through governmental intervention. In short,
Congress "was creating laissez faire, or economic free enterprise, for organized
7° Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role
of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 74-76 & nn.37 & 40 (1960). The Supreme Court
has stated that Norris-LaGuardia "was prompted by a desire ... to withdraw federal
courts from a type of controversy for which many believed they werre ill-suited and
from participation in which, it was feared, judicial prestige might suffer." Marine
Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 n.7 (1960).
7 ' Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R. Co.,
353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957).
" See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104-09, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079-82
(1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes maintained that
the policy of allowing free competition justifies the intentional inflicting of
temporal damage, including the damage of interference with a man's busi-
ness by some means, when the damage is done, not for its own sake, but as
an instrumentality in reaching the end of victory in the battle of trade ....
... 1 have seen the suggestion made that the conflict between
employers and employed is not competition. But I venture to assume that
none of my brethren would rely on that suggestion. If the policy on which
our law is founded is too narrowly expressed in the term "free competi-
tion," we may substitute "free struggle for life." Certainly the policy is not
limited to struggles between persons of the same class competing for the
same end. It applies to all conflicts of temporal interests.
Id. at 106-07, 44 N.E. at 1081.
Professor Frankfurter espoused the same philosophy.
Judged by authoritative utterances, contemporary society rests upon
certain assumptions: that social progress depends upon economic welfare;
that our economic system is founded upon the doctrine of free competi-
tion, accepting for its gains the costs of its ravages; that large aggregations
of capital are not inconsistent with the doctrine of free competition, but
are, indeed, inevitable and socially desirable; that the individual workers
must combine in order thereby to achieve the possibility of free competi-
tion with concentrated capital.
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 63, at 203-04.
73 S. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1932) (quoting American Steel
Foundries v, Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)).
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labor as well as big business." 74 Accordingly, the Act decreed that the courts
should not interfere with labor's efforts to exercise its protected rights—"first,
the right of free association, and, second, the right to advance the lawful ob-
jects of association." 75
Recognition of this broader purpose of Norris-LaGuardia—to establish a
system in which labor disputes are resolved by the natural interplay of the
competing economic forces of labor and capital rather than by the
government—refutes any contention that the policies of the Act.are less vital
now that unions have gained a measure of strength, and federal judges pre-
sumably a measure of equanimity, beyond that existing in 1932. Despite the
many developments in industrial relations which have occurred in this country
since 1932, it remains the case that "the use of economic pressure by the
parties to a labor dispute is not a grudging exception [under federal law]; it is
part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining" established by our
system of labor laws. 76 Certain forms of economic pressure—such as the
secondary boycott—are, of course, expressly prohibited. 77 Nevertheless, with
the exception of these specifically banned practices, Congress has left
"weapon[s] of self-help" available as part of "the balance of power between
labor and management expressed in our national labor policy." 78 Asa result,
legitimately employed strikes constitute an economic weapon implementing
and supporting the principles of collective bargaining.'`'
Following passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the question arose as to
when a federal court may enter an injunction in a labor dispute despite the
nonintervention policy established by Norris-LaGuardia. The answer began to
emerge in 1957 in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana
R.R. Co.," a case arising under the Railway Labor Act. 81 The Railway Labor
Act established a system for resolving disputes over the meaning of collective
bargaining agreements in the railroad industry. Under the statutory provi-
sions, if the parties cannot reach an agreement, the dispute is resolved by the
74 C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 192 (1946) [hereinafter cited as GREG-
ORY]. See also GREGORY at 186.
75 H.R. Rei'. No. 163, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
78 NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960).
77 See National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
Injunctions are expressly authorized in such cases by sections 10(h) and 10(1) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(h), (1) (1976). In addition, injunctions are expressly au-
thorized in "national emergency" strikes by § 208(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act., 29 U.S.C.
§ 178(b) (1976).
7 " Lodge 76, Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 427 U.S. 132,
146 (quoting Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1964)). It should be noted
that the policy favoring the resolution of labor disputes through the use of economic
force rather than through governmental intervention has been invoked by employers
at least as often as it has been invoked by unions. See Lodge 76, Machinists-, supra, at 147
(citing H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970); American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965)).
79 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 234 (1963).
" 353 U.S. 30 (1957).





National Railroad Adjustment Board, whose awards are final and binding
upon both parties to the dispute." Resort to the Board is mandatory."
In Chicago River, the Supreme Court was required to determine whether
federal courts could compel compliance with the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act by enjoining a union from striking where such strikes would "de-
feat the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board." 84 In concluding that
Norris-LaGuardia should not be construed to ban such an injunction, the
Court reasoned as follows:
[In Norris-LaGuardia] Congress acted to prevent the injunctions of
the federal courts from upsetting the natural interplay of the com-
peting economic forces of labor and capaital. Rep. LaGuardia, dur-
ing the floor debates on the 1932 Act, recognized that the machinery
of the Railway Labor Act channeled these economic forces, in mat-
ters dealing with railway labor, into special processes intended to
compromise them. Such controversies, therefore, arc not the same as
those in which the injunction strips labor of its primary weapon
without substituting any reasonable alternative."
Accordingly, the Chicago River Court held that an injunction could be entered
to prevent a strike from defeating the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board,"''
despite the provisions of Norris-LaGuradia, because that Board constituted an
alternative to the use of economic force in resolving labor disputes which jus-
tified depriving the union of the strike weapon.
Soon after the Court's decision in Chicago River, the question arose
whether the Court's holding applied to other industries where, in the absence
of statutorily-mandated arbitration, voluntary arbitration had been established
by collective bargaining agreement.. This question was complicated by several
actions which Congress took in passing the Taft-Harley Act in 1947. 87 First,
in section 301(a) of Taft-Hartley, Congress for the first time authorized fed-
eral courts to entertain suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements."
Second, Congress rejected a proposal that the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition
against injunctions be lifted to allow federal injunctive relief to ensorce collec-
tive bargaining agreements." Finally, Congress declared that "Minal adjust-
ment by a method agreed upon by the parties is ... the desirable method for
H2 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (in) (1976).
Chicago River, 353 U.S. at 34-35.
xa Id. at 39.
"5 hi. at 40-41 (footnotes omitted).
"" hi. at 42. See alco Locomotive Engineers v, Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co..
363 U.S. 528, 531 (1960), in which the Court described Chicago River as having turned
on "die superseding purpose of the Railway Labor Act to establish a system of compul-
sory arbitration for this type of dispute, a purpose which might be frustrated if strikes
could not be enjoined during the consideration or such a dispute by the Board. -
" Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (now codified
at 29 U.S.C. .§§ 171-187 (1976)).
Ks 29 U.S.C.	 185(a) (1976).
See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 409 (1976);
House CoNF. RPT. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947); 93 CONC.. REC. 6445-46
(1947).
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settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation
of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 9"
In 1957 the Supreme Court began the task of accommodating section 301
of Taft-Hartley with the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia. In
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,•' the Court ruled that under section 301 a
court may order specific performance of a commitment to arbitrate, Norris-
LaGuardia notwithstanding." Three years later, in the Steelworkers Trilogy,"
the Court held that where an employer and a union have agreed to arbitrate
grievances, a party refusing to arbitrate should be compelled to do so unless
the grievance in question is clearly excluded from the parties' arbitration
commitment." Further, the Steelworkers Court held that the award of an ar-
bitrator is entitled to deference and should be judicially enforced unless the
award is clearly unfaithful to the terms of the agreement. 95 This group of
decisions established voluntary arbitration as a favored child of the national
labor policy. Nonetheless, it remained to be seen whether the Court would
grant voluntary arbitration agreements the same protection from
jurisdiction-defeating strikes as the Chicago River Court afforded the compul-
sory arbitration mechanism of the Railway Labor Act.
The Court first squarely addressed the issue of the applicability of Chicago
River outside the Railway Labor Act context in a 1962 case, Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson." In Sinclair, a majority of the Court, relying heavily on Con-
gress' refusal to modify Norris-LaGuardia at the time it enacted section 301 of
Taft-Hartley, concluded that despite the existence of an arbitration agreement
and a no-strike clause, Norris-LaGuardia foreclosed the issuance of an injunc-
tion against a strike." Three Justices, however, drew a more specific lesson
from the congressional actions in 1947. 98 While agreeing that Norris-
LaGuardia is controlling where the question of enforcing a contractual no-
strike obligation stands alone," the three dissenters maintained that the strike
in Sinclair was enjoinable because it threatened the public policy favoring ar-
bitration. In their view, injunctions were not "barred against strikes over
" 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
91 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
92 Id. at 458-59.
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
94 Warrior, 363 U.S. at 582-83.
95 Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596-99.
96 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
92 Id. at 203, 214.
98 Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Douglas and Harlan. Id.
at 215.
" Id. at 225. Justice Brennan stated that
there is no general federal anti-strike policy; and although a suit may
be brought under § 301 against strikes which, while they are breaches
of private contracts, do not threaten any additional public policy, in






grievances which have been routed to arbitration by a contract specifically
enforceable against both the union and the employers." '"" Rather, the dissent-
ers reasoned, "enforced adherence to such arbitration commitments has
emerged as a dominant 'motif in the developing federal law of collective bar-
gaining agreements."'" The dissenters concluded, therefore, that a strike in
breach of a collective bargaining agreement may be enjoined where it is "over
a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate." "2
Sinclair was an extremely controversial decision. '" 3
 Just eight years later,
in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 1" the Supreme Court overruled
Sinclair and adopted the views of the Sinclair dissenters. The Boys Markets
Court specifically stated that the dissenting opinion in Sinclair states the cor-
rect principles concerning the accommodation necessary between the seem-
ingly absolute terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the policy considera-
tions underlying § 301(a)." "5
 In addition, the Boys Markets Court held that
the principles established in Chicago River were equally applicable where a
voluntary arbitration agreement is in effect.'° In so holding, the Court em-
phasized that the policies embodied in Norris-LaGuardia may be subordinated
to "an overriding interest in the successful implementation of the arbitration
process." "7
 Accordingly, the Boys Markets Court adopted the standards set
out in the Sinclair dissent."'
" 1" Id. at 224-25.
"I Id. at 225.
"2 hi. at 228.
"0
 Shortly after the decision was rendered, a special report on the Sinclair issue
was published by the Labor Relations Law Section of the American Bar Association.
Report of Special Atkinson -Sinclair Committee, ABA LABOR RELATIONS LAW SECTION
226 (1963). In that report, the neutral members of the "Special Atkinson
-Sinclair Com-
mittee" recommended that Sinclair he overruled to permit injunctions against breach-
of-contract strikes, but only where the dispute underlying the strike is arbitrable. Id. at
941-49.
"4 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
"5 Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
"6 Id. at 252.
in 7 Id.
"" Id. at 254. In determining the availability of injunctive relief, the Boys Mar-
kets Court set forth the following standards, as enunciated in the Sinclair dissent:
A District Court entertaining an action under 301 may not grant injunc-
tive rehef against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case
is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a
grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the Dis-
trict. Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the con-
tract does have that effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbi-
trate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike.
Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance
of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of
equity—whether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been
threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause
irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer
more from the denial of an injunction than will the union from its is-
suance.
Id. at 254 (quoting Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 228) (emphasis in original).
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One clear and consistent principle emerges from Chicago River, the
Sim;lair dissent, and Boys Markets—an injunction cannot be granted in a labor
dispute merely because a contractual undertaking, such as a no-strike com-
mitment, has been violated. However, where a mechanism has been
established—either by statute or by agreement—to resolve disputes through
arbitration rather than through economic force, the policy favoring arbitra-
tion justifies the issuance of an injunction in one "narrow" case: when a
union, by striking over an arbitrable grievance, attempts to deprive the
employer of his right to have the dispute resolved by arbitration.'•
After Boys Markets, the question arose whether the narrow exception to
the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction policy established by Chicago River and
Boys Markets is applicable to sympathy strikes. Sympathy strikes, such as a re-
fusal to cross another union's picket line, differ from other strikes in one
respect which is critical to the question of injunctive relief—they generally do
not arise out of grievances which are subject to the arbitration machinery
agreed upon by the parties. Hence, sympathy strikes generally do not repre-
sent an effort. to deprive the employer of the right to have a dispute resolved
by arbitration.
The applicability of Norris-LaGuardia to sympathy strikes is beyond ques-
tion. In enacting Norris-LaGuardia, Congress intended to stake out a broad
"area of economic conflict that had best be left to economic forces and the
pressure of public opinion." " (1 Overruling judicial opinions which had
sought to define narrowly an area of legitimate union self-interest in which
the use of economic force was considered to be allowable,'" Congress de-
clared in Norris-LaGuardia that no injunction could issue in "any controversy
concerning terms and conditions of employment, ... regardless of whether or
not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee," or against any participant in such a dispute who has a "direct or
indirect interest therein." " 2 The Act thus protects sympathetic action di-
rected at improving the lot of other workers.' As the Supreme Court stated
only last Term, Norris-LaGuardia protects the "right of wage earners to or-
1 " Id. at 252-53.
' 1 " United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941).
'" See id. at 230-31 (discussing Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443 (1921)). See also FRANFURTER & GREENE, supra note 63, at 215-16.
12 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1976); see 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1976).
" 3
 That sympathy strikes come within the protection of Norris-LaGuardia has
been clear since the Supreme Court's 1938 decision in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938). The New Negro Alliance was a corporation "com-
posed of colored persons, organized for the mutual improvement_ of its members and
for the promotion of civic, educational, benevolent., and charitable enterprises." Id. at
555. The organization picketed a chain of grocery stores after the owner rejected the
Alliance's demands that it employ blacks. The picketing members of the Alliance
themselves did not desire employment with the stores. Rather, the picketing clearly
was designed to benefit blacks in general. The Court, relying on 29 U.S.C. § 113, held
that. Norris-LaGuardia prevented the Alliance's action from being enjoined. 303 U.S.
at 560.
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ganize and to act. jointly in questions affecting wages, conditions of labor, and
the welfare of labor generally: , 114
In 1976 the Court affirmed the protection of Norris-LaGuardia for sym-
pathy strikes in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers. "5 The Court held that
the lower court properly found itself without jurisdiction to grant injunctive
relief against a unit of production and maintenance (P & M) employees who
refused to cross a picket line established by a unit of office and technical (0 &
T) employees working at the same location)' The P & M and 0 & T
employees in Buffett° Forge were represented by separate Steelworkers locals.
The 0 & T strike had been sparked by the employer's resistance to negotiat-
ing an initial collective bargaining agreement for the 0 & T local."' The
collective bargaining agreement in effect between the employer and the strik-
ing P & M local contained a broad no-strike clause)" This clause, however,
did not expressly refer to sympathy strikes, and the union contended that the
clause did not forbid such strikes. Additionally, the agreement contained a
broad commitment to arbitrate certain disputes."" Although the question
whether the union's sympathy strike violated the no-strike clause was an ar-
bitrable dispute, the issue underlying the sympathy strike—the desire of the P
" 4 Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, —U.S. —, 98 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 n.14 (1978)
(quoting S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess 9 (1932)) (emphasis by the Court). While
the area of permissible union activity has been narrowed in some respects since 1932,
see, e.g., the secondary boycott provisions of Taft-Hartley, sympathy strikes remain pro-
tected activity, not only under Norris-LaGuardia, but under the NLRA as well. See
Eastex, 98 S. Ct. at 2512 n.13 (citing with approval Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137
N.L.R.B. 1545, 1546-47, 50 L.R.R.M. 1440, 1440-41 (1962), enforced sub nom.
Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011, 54 L.R.R.M. 2707 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964)). Indeed, the language of § 7 of the NLRA was modeled
after that found in § 2 of Norris-LaGuardia. See Eastex, 98 S. Ct. at 2512 n.14. As the
Eastex Court stated:
The "employees" who may engage in concerted activities for "mutual aid
or protection" are defined by § 2 (3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) to
"include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a par-
ticular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise...." This defini-
tion was intended to protect employees when they engage in otherwise
proper concerted activities in support of employees of employers other
than their OWil. In recognition of this intent, the Board and the courts long
have held that the "mutual aid or protection" clause encompasses such ac-
tivity. .. .
... The 74th Congress knew well enough that labor's cause often is
advanced on fronts other than collective bargaining and grievance settle-
ment within the immediate employment context. It recognized this fact by
choosing, as the language of § 7 makes clear, to protect concerted activities
for the somewhat broader purpose of "mutual aid or protection" as well as
for the narrower purposes of "self-organization" and "collective bargain-
Mg."
Eastex, 98 S. Ct. at 2511-12 (footnotes omitted).
'' 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
"ti Id. at 403-04, 412-13.
" 7 See id. at 399-404.
"1 " Id. at 399 &
"9 Id. at 399-400 & n.2.
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& M local to support the 0 & T local in the latter s contract efforts—was not
arbitrable.'" The P & M local agreed to submit the issue whether the sytn-
pathy strike was in breach of contract to arbitration and to abide by the
award. The employer chose to ignore the offer to arbitrate, however, and
sought an injunction against the sympathy strike, claiming, ironically, that in-
junctive relief was necessary in aid of arbitration.'"
The Supreme Court rejected the employer's contention that the sympathy
strike should have been enjoined pending an arbitrator's ruling as to whether
the strike was in breach of contract. 122 Notwithstanding the five to four split
of the Buffalo Forge Court and the curious alignment of the Justices,' 21 the
decision, in my view, flows inexorably from the principles established in the
Court's earlier rulings. A contrary result would have upset long-established
doctrines regarding the role of the federal courts in labor disputes.
The key to the Court's ruling in Buffalo Forge was recognition of the prin-
ciple, clearly enunciated in Chicago River and Boys Markets, that injunctions are
permitted only where they are "essential to carry out promises to arbitrate
and to implement the private arrangements for the administration of the con-
tract. >, 129 While striking over an arbitrable dispute interferes with and frus-
trates the arbitral process,'" the arbitral process is not frustrated by a strike
which does not concern an arbitrable issue and, therefore, which does not
seek to bypass arbitration.' 26 A claim that the strike is in breach of contract
does "not in itself warrant an injunction," 127 because "the Court has never
indicated that the courts may enjoin actual or threatened contract violations
despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 128 To the contrary, all of the Justices
who participated in Sinclair and Boys Markets recognized that, in light of Con-
gress' refusal to modify Norris-LaGuardia in 1947 when enacting section
301(a) of Taft-Hartley, an injunction cannot be issued merely because a party
has breached a collective bargaining agreement—whether the breach is of the
no-strike clause or of any other provision.'" The only collectively-bargained
commitment which can form the predicate for an injunction is an agreement
to arbitrate a dispute, because this provision alone provides a "reasonable al-
ternative" to the use of economic force.'"
Thus, it is quite beside the point to complain, as Mr. Kramer does, that
unless a no -strike agreement can be enforced by injunctive relief, an employer
120 See id. at 404-05.
121 See id. at 401 n.3, 410.
122 Id. at 412 - 13.
123 The opinion of the Court was written by Justice White, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Justice Stevens dissented,
joined by Justice Brennan, the author of Boys Markets, and Justices Marshall and Pow-
ell.
124 428 U.S. at 411.
123 Id. at 407.
126
 Id. at 412.
127 Id. at 409.
128 Id.
129 See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 249-51, 255-56 (Black, J., dissenting); Sinclair,
370 U.S. at 205, 224 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130 See text at note 109 supra.
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will not receive "the benefit of his bargain," or to contend that Norris-
LaGuardia cannot possibly he violated by an injunction simply compelling a
union to carry out a voluntarily agreed upon commitment."' Leaving aside
the thorny question whether the sympathy action in Buffalo Forge was in Fact a
breach of contract, 132
 the important point is that under Norris-LaGuardia,
injunctions are not available merely to protect the contractual expectations of
employers and unions. As the Court recognized in Buffalo Forge, to disregard
this point would lead to the authorization of injunctions in a wide range of
situations in which, for good reason, injunctions thus far have been un-
available.' 33 If injunctions were available simply to enforce contractual
agreements, then whenever a union believed an employer violated a contractual
131 Kramer, supra this issue, text at notes 92-93. See also Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S.
at 415-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting): Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitration. Re-
casting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. REv. 533, 546-47 (1978).
12 if courts were allowed to enjoin strikes over nonarbitrable matters, in many
cases injunctions would prevent lawful activity—a result which would be antithetical to
the policies of Norris-LaGuardia. Unless a no-strike clause expressly prohibits such
strikes, it generally cannot be assumed that sympathy strikes violate even a broac.11y
worded no-strike clause. In Buffalo Forge, as the Court stressed, the union denied that.
its no-strike commitment applied to sympathy strikes. 428 U.S. at 405. The Court
contrasted this situation with Boys Markets where the strike clearly violated a m.)-strike
clause. Id. at 406. I think the better position is that sympathy strikes should be as-
sumed not to violate a no-strike clause unless the clause expressly prohibits such strikes.
The Supreme Court has stated that, absent evidence to the contrary, "the agreement
to arbitrate and the duty not to strike should he construed as having coterminous
application." Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974).
Thus, a no-strike clause ordinarily should not be construed to apply to matters which
are outside the agreement to arbitrate. In addition, since the right to engage in a
sympathy strike is protected by section 7 of the NLRA, that right should not be
deemed to have been waived except by express and unambiguous language. Local 18,
Operating Engineers (Davis-McKee, Inc.), 238 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 99 L.R.R.M. 1307
(1978).
This points to an additional reason why the Buffalo Forge result is sound. Since a
strike over a matter which is not arbitrable should ordinarily be considered not to
violate a no-strike clause, before a court could properly conclude that an injuni:tion
should issue against such a strike, the court would have to analyze bargaining history,
industry practice, and other relevant factors in order to determine whether the parties
intended by their contract to prohibit the strike. As the Buffalo Forge majority recog-
nized,
this would ... involve hearings, findings, and judicial interpretations of
collective-bargaining contracts. It is incredible to believe that the courts
would always view the facts and the contract as the arbitrator would; and it
is difficult. to believe that the arbitrator would not be heavily influenced or
wholly pre-empted by judicial views of the facts and the meaning of con-
tracts .
428 U.S. at 412. Thus, courts inevitably would enjoin activity which arbitrators would
have found not to he in breach of contract. Consider, for example, the conduct which
was held to violate a no-strike clause in National Rejectors Industries v. United Steel-
workers, 562 F.2d 1069, 1074-75, 96 L.R.R.M. 2120, 2124 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 923 (1978). As is well recognized, once concerted activity has been enjoined,
it seldom can be revived. See Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S at '112; FRANKFURTER & GREENE:,
supra note 63, at 201.
'' 428 U.S. at 410.
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provision, the union could seek an injunction requiring the employer to re-
store the status quo pending arbitration of the validity of the employer's action.
To be sure, such injunctions should be available to unions in some cir-
cumstances, particularly when an employer has taken action which defeats the
possibility of meaningful arbitration of a dispute.'" I doubt, however, that
Mr. Kramer would agree that injunctions should issue to forestall an
employer's contract. breach where the breach does not frustrate the arbitration
process.
' 34 In a well-reasoned opinion, Lever Bros. Co. v. Chemical Workers, 554 F.2d
115, 95 L.R.R.M. 2438 (4th Cir. 1976), the Fourth Circuit affirmed an injunction pre-
venting an employer from transferring its plant from Maryland to Indiana pending
arbitration of the validity of the relocation. The court stressed that if the plant were
relocated before the arbitrator had a chance to rule, the arbitrator would be presented
with a fail accompli which he would be virtually powerless to undo. Thus, an injunction
was proper to prevent "the injury which would occur to the arbitral process if the
permanent transfer of the plant was permitted in this case pending arbitration." Id. at
122, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2443 (addendum to opinion). The Fourth Circuit has subsequently
applied Lever Bros. to affirm an injunction preventing an employer from continuing to
partially liquidate its business pending arbitration of the validity of its actions.
Teamsters Local 71 v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 99 L.R.R.M. 2601 (4th
Cir. 1978). The court explained that
[Lever Bros.] was consistent with the underlying rationale of Buffalo Forge,
that the process of arbitration is preferred and the jurisdiction of the arbi-
trator is to be protected. The lynchpin of Buffalo Forge was the Court's
finding that the sympathy strike at issue would not frustrate the arbitration
process. The lynchpin of Lever Brothers was our finding that relocation of
the plant would have precisely that effect.
582 F.2d at 1341, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2604-05.
The Second and Ninth Circuits have adopted approaches to the question of in-
junctions against. employers which differ from that of the Fourth Circuit. In Hoh v.
Pepsieo, Inc., 491 F.2d 556, 85 L.R.R.M. 2516 (2c1 Cir. 1974), a pre-Buffalo Forge deci-
sion, the Second Circuit did not appear to consider the question as turning on whether
an injunction is necessary to preserve the viability of arbitration. Instead, the court
assumed that an injunction could issue if the provisions of § 7 of Norris-LaGuardia, 29
U.S.C. § 107 (1976), were satisfied, and if the union satisfied the "ordinary principles
of equity," including- a likelihood of success on the merits--a factor rejected in Akers
Motor Lines, 582 F.2d at 1342, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2605, and not mentioned in Boys Markets
or Buffalo Forge. See Hoh, 491 F.2d at 560-61, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2519-20.
In Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237, 95
L.R.R.M. 2097 (9th Cir. 1977), a case which had been remanded for reconsideration in
light of Buffalo Forge. the Ninth Circuit held that an injunction directing an employer
to preserve the status quo pending arhitration could not issue because the employer
had made no promise to do so. The court stated that such a promise "would be to
Greyhound what an undertaking not to strike would be to a union." Id. at 1238, 95
L.R.R.M. at 2098. While the court's premise can be questioned, see Gould, supra note
131, at 558-60, the Greyhound decision may not actually conflict with Lever Bros. The
Ninth Circuit indicated that a commitment to preserve the status quo might he implied
in a case where the alteration of the status would "frustrate and interfere with the
arbit.ral process." 550 F.2d at 1238-39, 95 L.R.R.M. at 2098, Since the Greyhound case
did not involve such a situation, but rather a dispute over work schedules, the case is
easily distinguished from Lever Bros. and Akers Motor Lines, as the Fourth Circuit has
noted. See /Mow Motor Lines, 582 F.2d at 1341, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2604.
In my view, the Fourth Circuit's approach is the proper one, and flows directly
from Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge. Injunctions against employers should not be is-
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Yet, the rationale of the dissent in Buffalo Forge would lead to precisely
that result. Although the dissent candidly recognized that a sympathy strike
does not frustrate the arbitration process, 135 the dissent nevertheless could see
no reason not to enjoin a strike which is in breach of contract, at least where
the breach is clear. Viewing the arbitration process as a present agreement to
remove future contractual ambiguities, the dissent concluded that "if the
specific situation is foreseen and described in the contract itself with such
precision that there is no need for interpretation by an arbitrator, it would be
reasonable to give the same legal effect to such an agreement prior to the
arbitrator's decision." "6 Obviously, this reasoning would authorize injunc-
tions not only against breaches of a no-strike clause, but against any "unam-
biguous" breach of contract. At bottom, then, the Buffalo Forge ruling cannot
be disputed in principle unless one adopts the view that injunctions should be
available to remedy any breach—or at least any "unambiguous" breach—of a
collective bargaining agreement. That view was rejected by Congress in
1947, 137
 and few would advocate it today.
It may be argued that a no-strike clause can be distinguished from other
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement in that the no-strike clause is
the "quid pro quo" for the arbitration clause. Justice Stevens adopted this
view in his Buffalo Forge dissent, arguing that the absence of an injunctive
 against sympathy strikes will "frustrate the ... basic policy of motivat-
ing employers to agree to binding arbitration by giving them an effective 'as-
surance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the agreement.'" 138
But whatever may be the validity of the notion of a "quid pro quo" relation-
sued simply because a contract has been violated, but, where the employer's actions
would defeat the possibility of meaningful arbitration of a dispute, an injunction re-
storing the status quo is called for. One situation in which this prerequisite will gener-
ally be met is a case in which an employer proposes a major change in operations
which would confront an arbitrator with a Pie accompli, as in Lever Bros. and in Akers
Motor Lines. Another illustration, among several which could be cited, is where the
employer's action would endanger the health or safety of employees. See Texaco Inde-
pendent Union v. Texaco, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 1097, 99 L.R.R.M. 2147, 2148 (W.D. Pa.
1978), and cases cited therein.
In addition, when an employer obtains a Boys Markets injunction against a strike, a
court has clear authority to require the employer to preserve the status quo, as a
condition to granting the injunction. See Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-
Texas K.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1960).
135
 428 U.S. at 423-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 "" Id. at 426 (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens further stated:
In this case, the question whether the sympathy strike violates the no-strike
clause is an arbitrable issue. If the court had the benefit of an arbitrator's .
resolution of the issue in favor of the employer, it could enforce that deci-
sion just as it could require the parties to submit the issue to arbitration.
And if the agreement were so plainly unambiguous that there could be no
bona fide issue to submit to the arbitrator, there must be the same author-
ity to enforce the parties' bargain pending the arbitrator's final decision.
"7 See text at note 89 supra.
1 " 8
 Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ship between no-strike clauses and arbitration clauses, absolutely no basis
exists fOr believing that employers will lose their motivation to agree to arbi-
tration procedures if they cannot obtain injunctive relief against sympathy
strikes. The division of courts concerning the enjoinability of sympathy strikes
prior to Buffalo Forge clearly indicates that employers could not have assumed
with any confidence that sympathy strikes could be enjoined.'" Yet this un-
certainty did not dissuade employers from agreeing to arbitration provisions.
I am convinced that employers will not lose their motivation to negotiate
arbitration provisions merely because, after Buffalo Forge, the uncertainty was
resolved against the enjoinability of sympathy strikes. To the contrary, the
obtaining of a union's commitment. not to strike over arbitrable grievances, en-
forceable by injunction, coupled with the stability and the considerable addi-
tional advantages which arbitration brings to any employer, are more than
enough "quid" for the "quo" of the employer's agreement to arbitrate griev-
ances. In my experience, almost all employers welcome a grievance arbitra-
tion mechanism as a means of improving employee trust and morale, and as a
method of directing employee dissatisfaction with management decisions into
nondestructive channels. It may well be that some employers would not agree
to arbitrate disputes while at the same time leaving a union free to strike over
those disputes; but that. is a far cry from assuming that employers will not
agree to arbitrate unless they are assured that even sympathy strikes over
nonarbitrable matters may be enjoined. Such an assumption would be based
on a conception of arbitration as the "ultimate concession" by an employer—a
conception which is not accurate today, if it ever was.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that where a sympathy strike is in
fact a breach of the collective bargaining agreement, an employer has a
number of remedies available. Assuming—as in Buffalo Forge—that the legal-
ity of the strike is an arbitrable issue, the employer can compel the union to
arbitrate that issue.'" If the arbitrator rules in the employer's favor, he has
the power to order appropriate relief as provided by the contract between the
parties. In addition, the arbitrator's award, if disobeyed, may he enforced in
federal court."' During the period prior to the implementation of the arbi-
trator's ruling—a period which need not be long, especially if the parties have
agreed to contract language requiring expeditious handling of such
grievances 142 —an employer retains the prerogative to take appropriate dis-
";v See 428 U.S. at 404 n.9. It must be remembered that Buffala Forge did not
announce an unanticipated rule contrary to prior labor and management assumptions.
As far back as 1963, the neutral members of the Special Atkinson-Sinclair Committee
expressly stated that injunctions should be permitted only where a strike is over an
arbitrable grievance. Sec note 103 supra. As we have seen, the requirement of arbitra-
bility was also an integral part of the rationale of Boys Markets. See generally text and
notes 104-09 Supra.
I4i See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 458-59; see text and notes 91-92 supra.
141 See Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 405.
' a2
 The union members of the Special Atkinson-Sinclair Committee of the ABA
Labor Law Section recommended the negotiation of such language in their 1963 Re-
port. ABA LABOR RELATioNs LAW SECTION, S1/Ira note 103, at 239. Many unions would
he willing to agree to provisions providing for expedited arbitration of' alleged viola-
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ciplinary action, including discharge, against those employees engaged in a
sympathy strike he deems to be unlawful, subject, of course, to challenge in
the grievance procedure. Finally, the employer can institute a section 301
damage action. Consequently, sympathy strikes do not present unreasonable
problems for employers, and there is no reason to legislatively overrule the
sound decision in Blyfalo Forge.
A more difficult question is raised by certain activities not authorized by a
union, i.e., "wildcat" strikes and "stranger picketing." Employers have com-
plained that such activity has reached epidemic proportions in some sectors,
primarily the coal mining industry. I n many cases, the courts have expressed
the same concern,"" and quite ohen these hard cases have made bad law." 4
dons of a no-strike clause, at least if management would agree to similar treatment of
certain categories of grievances, such as those alleging serious violations of a safety and
health clause, discharge cases, and disputes regarding contracting out work.
143 See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 570 F.2d 467, 479-
80, 97 L.R.R.M. 2836, 2844-45 (3d Cir. 1978).
' 44
 An example is the Eazor Express doctrine, which holds a union liable for
failing to fulfill an implied obligation to use "every reasonable means" to bring an end
10 an unauthorized strike. See Eazor Express. Inc. v. Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 959, 89
L.R.R.M. 3177, 3183 (3d Cir, 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976); United States
Steel Corp, v. United Mine Workers, 534 F.2d 1061, 1072-74, 91 L.R.R.M. 1031,
3037-40 (3d Cir. 1976) (U.S, Steel 1); Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers,
570 F.2d 4(17, 477-80, 97 L.R.R.M. 2836, 2843-45 (3d Cir. 1978), Contra. Southern
Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 551 F.2d 695, 7(11, 94 1..R.R.M. 2609, 2612
(huh Cir. 1977); Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 582 F.2d 1346, 1350-51, 99
L.R.R.M. 2520, 2522-23 (4th Cir. 1978). The misguided nature of the Lazo,- Express
doctrine is clearly demonstrated in Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions' Narrowing
Path lo Rectitude, 50 IND. 1.. REv. 472 (1975), and in 80 HAIM L. RE". 601 (1976).
Similarly, several courts have undertaken to limit the force of Buffalo Forge by
suggesting that a sympathy strike may be enjoined if the strike which "triggered - the
sympathy strike was over an arbitrable grievance, even though the sympathy strikers
are not themselves under any obligation to arbitrate that grievance or any other matter
giving rise to the sympathy strike. The Third Circuit appeared to reject such an ap-
proach in United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 548 F.2d (17, 73-74, 94
L.R,R.M. 2049, 2053-54 (3d Cir. 197(1) (U.S. Steel 10, but subsequently viewed the issue
as open in Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 570 F.2d 467, 476-77, 97
L.R.R.M. 2836, 2812-43 (3d Cir. 1978). Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have re-
jected the :ivailahility of an injunction against a sympathy strike despite claims Mat the
"triggering" strike involved an arbitrable grievance. Nevertheless, both courts indicated
that an injunction could have issued if the sympathy strikers were shown to have
adopted the arbitrable grievances, and the goals of the unlawful strike, "as their own. •
See Ziegler Coal Co. v. Local 1870, United Mine Workers, 566 F.2c1 582, 585, 96
L.R.R.M, 33(10, 33(13 (7th Cir. 1977); Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Work-
ers, 551 F.2d 695, 703. 94 L.R.R.M. 26011, 2613-14 ((i11i Cir. 1977). The Fourth Circuit
has tiflirmed the issuance of an injunction against a sympathy strike where the "trig-
gering-
 strike and the sympathy strike involved the same bargaining agreement and
bargaining unit, and an arbitration award invoking one or the striking locals would
have affected the other. Cedar Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 560 F.2d 1153,
1171-72. 95 1..R.R.N1. 3015. 3030 (4111 Cir. 1977).
These decisions miss die point of Buffalo Jorge. If the sympathy strikers are not
themselves evading an obligation to tirbitrate a dispute with their employer, under
Buffalo Forge no basis exists finr granting an injunction simply because the sympathy
strike was triggered by a strike over an issue which another union was obligated to
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Considerable congressional attention was focused on this problem during the
consideration of the labor law reform bills last year. The Senate Committee
on Human Resources stated:
[I]n order to promote industrial peace, action [is] required to pro-
vide an added remedy against the debilitating illegal work stoppages
which have in particular plagued the coal fields of Appalachia.
These work stoppages do not arise in the course of or in response to
an economic strike following the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement, or other union authorized concerted activity.'"
The Committee proposed legislation which would have empowered the courts
to enjoin concerted refusals to work, in breach of contract, where the refusals
are a response to any picket line other than one set up by a union to further
its position in a labor dispute. In addition, the bills would have permitted
injunctions against unauthorized breach of contract strikes, where union pick-
eting over a labor dispute is not involved.'"
The theory of these provisions was that "unauthorized activity under-
mines industrial peace and the majority rule principle of the NLRA," and that
in such circumstances "the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia Act are not
threatened by providing equitable remedies for concerted activities in breach
of contract." I" That is to say, where a contract is in force, work stoppages
called by a union in furtherance of its position in a labor dispute occupy a
distinctly different status in our system of collective bargaining than do work
stoppages which are not authorized by a union and which are not in response
to a picket line set up by a union.
arbitrate. Of course, where the "triggering" strike in fact is over an arbitrable issue and
in breach of contract, and the other Boys Markets prerequisites are present, the trigger-
ing strike may be enjoined. Additionally, it has been suggested that in appropriate
circumstances such an injunction could prohibit sympathetic activity against the
employer affected by that strike on the part of "persons in active concert and/or par-
ticipation with" the strikers, provided those persons have notice of the injunction, pur-
suant to FED. R. CR'. P. 65(d), and provided that the requirements of §§ 7 and 9 of
Norris-LaGuardia, 29 U.S.C. §§ 107, 109, are met. See generally Bituminous Coal
Operators Ass'n v. United Mine Workers, 585 F.2d 586, 598-99, 99 L.R.R.M. 2612,
2621-22 (3d Cir. 1978). But there is simply no basis, under Buffalo Forge, to enjoin any
activity which could not. properly be reached by an injunction against the "triggering"
strike.
145 S. REP. No, 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1978).
146 S.3 2647, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13, 124 Colic. Rcc. 57528 (daily ecl. May 16,
1978). The full text of the injunctive relief provision of S. 2467 may be found at
Kramer, supra this issue, note 94. The legislation passed by the House also contained a
provision dealing with injunctions against unauthorized activity, which differed sub-
stantially from the Senate bill. H.R. 8410 permitted an injunction against "any person
not authorized by a representative of the employees of the employer being struck or
picketed," to prevent that person from "engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any
employee of the employer to engage in, conduct in breach of [a no-strike] agree-
ment .... Under H.R. 8410, such an injunction could be issued only on petition of the
NLRB. H,R, 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12, 123 CONG. REC. H10710 (daily ed. Oct.
6, 1977). The full text of the injunctive relief provision of H.R., 8410 may he found at
Kramer, supra this issue, note 95.
147 S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1978).
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Authorized strikes are part and parcel of our system of free collective bar-
gaining; as the Supreme Court has stated, the strike weapon "implements and
supports the principles of the collective bargaining system."'" Unauthorized
strikes and stranger picketing, in contrast, are likely to impede the collective
bargaining system, since they are contrary to "the principle of majority rule"
which is "[c]entral to the policy of fostering collective bargaining." I" For
these reasons, the Senate Committee concluded that injunctions against
wildcat strikes and stranger picketing would not represent as great a threat to
the policies of Norris-LaGuardia as injunctions restraining work stoppages
called by a union, or picket lines set up by a union.
While proposing broader availability of injunctions against stranger pick-
eting avd wildcat strikes, the Senate Committee emphatically refused to over-
rule Buffalo Forge, stating that the Supreme Court's decision represents a
"careful accommodation" between the policies of Norris-LaGuardia and those
of the NLRA. 15" The Senate Committee's approach to dealing with the strike
injunction issue may present a framework for further exploration of this area.
Any proposals for increased use of the labor injunction should be directed at
the precise problems sought to he addressed—stranger picketing and wildcat
strikes—without adversely affecting other areas of lawful conduct or con-
certed activities. As so delimited, the central policies of Norris-LaGuardia are
not so strongly at stake. By contrast, proposals aimed at Buffalo Forge would
go to the heart of Norris-LaGuardia and would abandon the basic principles
of that statute.
III. MAKE-WHOLE REMEDY
A major weakness of the National Labor Relations Act lies in its failure
adequately to protect the right of workers to organize. Indeed, much of the
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Labor Management Relations
and the Senate Subcommittee on Labor focused on the abuse of employee
rights to freely organize and to select collective bargaining representatives.'"
But the right to organize, while unquestionably central to the policies of the
Act, is not the only right which Congress has viewed as indispensible to
employees. Rather, the fundamental purpose of the Act is to enable
employees not only to combine and to elect representatives, but "to bargain
collectively through [those] representatives of their own choosing." 152 O rgan i_
"9
 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 234 (1963).
149 Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S.
50, 62 (1975). in addition, as the Court recognized in Emporium, "a union ... has a
legitimate interest in presenting a united front ... and in not seeing its strength dissi-
pated and its stature denigrated by subgroups within the unit separately pursuing what
they see as separate interests. - Id. at 70.
' 5 " S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1978).
15 ' For example, see Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., lit Sess. 741 n.1 (1976) (state-
ment of Nicholas A. Zonarich).
152
 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (emphasis added).
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zation is only the first step in a process which should lead, through the
medium of good faith bargaining, to a collective bargaining agreement. Un-
fortunately, experience has shown that just as the Act presently provides in-
adequate protection of the right to organize, in all too many cases the Act
likewise fails to make meaningful the right of employees to bargain collec-
tively toward a contract.
This reality is highlighted by a study conducted in 1975 by the Industrial
Union Department (IUD) of the AFL-CIO. The IUD, which, among other
things, maintains a coordinated organizing program, conducted a follow-up
study of election victories achieved under the coordinated program. That
study indicates that out of 148 certified election victories between 1963 and
1974, only 63 percent ultimately resulted in a collective bargaining agree-
ment.'" A similar study of all AFL-CIO election victories in 1970 yielded
almost identical results.'" I submit that these statistics cannot be explained
away as the natural result of "hard bargaining." Instead, these figures indicate
that bad faith bargaining has become a major stumbling block to the achieve-
ment of statutory objectives.
At the present time, if an employer refuses to bargain with a union and
instead chooses to litigate whether his action violates the Act, his employees
are not entitled to wages and benefits lost in the interim, even if the employer
ultimately is found to have violated the law. 155 Without cost to himself, an
emWoyer can refuse to bargain solely to delay reaching an agreement with the
union. No legal incentive compels an employer to recognize and to bargain
with the union certified after a Board election. Thus, an employer can stall
bargaining for months or years until an order is issued requiring him to do
what he should have ,done originally—commence good faith negotiations. In
the meantime, employees are denied the wages and benefits that they would
have received had their employer bargained in a lawful manner. Not surpris-
ingly, it appears that the weapon of "bad faith bargaining" increasingly is re-
lied upon by employers to defeat the exercise of section 7 rights by
employees. In 1959, the year of the last major amendments to the Act, ap-
proximately 1,300 refusal to bargain charges were filed under section 8(a)(5),
representing 16 percent of all unfair labor practice charges. By 1976, section
8(a)(5) charges had increased over five-fold to 6,729 and represented approx-
imately 30 percent of all charges filed.' 5 "
Clearly, action must be taken to stem this tide or the protections of the
Act will continue to be meaningless in numerous situations. The law must he
'3 A copy of this study is available in the author's files.
154 See Hearings Before the Subcomrn. on Labor-Management Relations q. the House
Conan. on Education and Labor, 95111 Cong., 1st Sess. 741 (1976) (statement of Nicholas
A. Zonarich).
'" See Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 109-10, 74 1,.R.R.M. 1740, 1743
(1970); for a discussion of Ex-Cell-0, see text and notes 160-66 infra,
15" The above data comes from unpublished NLRB statistics available, upon re-
quest, to the public. In 1959, 26.1 percent of charges filed were found to have merit.
Since that time the merit factor has generally hovered around the 30.9 percent mark.
Thus, the increase in unfair labor practice charges since 1959 is directly related to an
increase in the number of unfair labor practices committed.
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applied such that employers will be induced to bargain promptly and in good
faith with the duly selected bargaining representative of their employees. The
Board's approach to date has been totally unsatisfactory. Section 10(c) of the
Act provides that the Board may issue orders requiring "such affirmative ac-
tion ... as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]." 157 Despite this broad
congressional mandate, which, as the courts have repeatedly emphasized, 15 "
gives the Board wide discretion in fashioning adequate and effective rem-
edies, the usual Board order in refusal to bargain cases consists only of a
mandate to "cease and desist." Indeed, "Labor Board orders constitute in
many situations no more than a 'slap on the wrist.' They are both to() little
and too late." ' 5" As a result, in this critical area, present Board remedies fail
to effectuate the policies of the NLRA.
The Board itself has explicitly recognized the problem. In the Board's
famous Ex-Cell-0 Corp. decision,'"" the union sought and the trial examiner
recommended that the Board order the employer to make the employees
"whole" by fashioning a remedy whereby the employees would receive—in
the form of backpay—an amount equal to the estimated increased benefits
employees would have received had the employer bargained in good faith
from the outset.'" A three-member majority of the Board acknowledged
that current Board remedies for violations of section 8(a)(5) 112 were in-
adequate, stating:
A mere affirmative order that an employer bargain upon request.
does not eradicate the effects of an unlawful delay of 2 or more
years in the fulfillment of a statutory bargaining obligation. It does
not put the employees in the position of bargaining strength they
would have enjoyed if their employer had immediately recognized
and bargained with their chosen representative. It does not. dissolve
the inevitable employee frustration or protect the Union from a loss
of employee support attributable to such delay.'"
Nevertheless, the Board concluded that a make-whole remedy was not within
the Board's power to grant.'"
On appeal, the United States Court, of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, the only court which thus far has considered the availability of a make-
whole remedy, disagreed with the Ex-Cell-0 Board and expressly held that a
' 57 29 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1976).
13M E.g., Golden Stale Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 175-77 (1973);
NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288 (1957).
159 SUBCOMM. ON NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD OF 'FIIE HOUSE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT BY THE Nl.RB 1-2 (Comm. Print 1961).
I"I' 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 74 1..R.R.N.1. 1740 (1970).
'"' Id. at 108, 74 L.R.R.1sA. at 1741.
'"' 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
1 " 3 185 N.L.R.B. at 108, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1741.
1>0 Id. at 109-10, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1743. Two Board members dissented. Id. at
III, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1743.
•56	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:27
make-whole remedy was within the Board's remedial powers. 165 Despite the
clurt of appeals decision, however, the Board continues to assert that it lacks
the power to order such a remedy. 166
In the face of the Board's unwillingness to order make-whole remedies
for section 8(a)(5) violations, labor reform bills H.R. 8410 and S. 2467 would
have allowed the Board to grant such remedies under certain conditions.'"
The bills provided that where an employer unlawfully refuses to bargain for
an initial contract, the Board would be authorized to compensate the
employees for the delay. The compensation would equal the difference be-
tween the wages and fringe benefits received by the employees during the
period of the delay, and a sum determined by the wages and fringe benefits
received at the time the unfair labor practice began as multiplied by the per-
centage change in wages and other benefits stated in the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' quarterly report of major collective bargaining settlements for the
quarter in which the delay began.'" Mr. Kramer, along with numerous
other critics of the make-whole remedy, argues that the remedy is unaccept-
able because it is inexact or speculative.'" In addition, Mr. Kramer argues
that such a remedy would "set. the floor" for future negotiations.' dis-
agree on both counts.
Mr. Kramer's objection that the make-whole remedy is speculative disre-
gards a cardinal common law principle. This principle holds that one whose
wrongful act precludes exact determination of the amount of damage cannot
evade his duty to compensate for that damage because of the uncertainty
caused by his own wrongdoing.' 7 ' Thus, where a defendant's wrongful act
prevents exact determination of the plaintiff's earnings and profits had the
injury not occurred, it is settled that the defendant cannot plead uncertainty
respecting the amount of the damages awarded. This rule was reviewed and
approved by the Supreme Court in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment
1 i 5 Auto Workers	 NLRB (Ex-Cell-0 Corp.), 449 F.2d 1046, 1050-53, 76
1...R.R.M. 2753, 2756-58 (D.C. Cir, 1971). See also I UE v. NLRB (Tiidee Products), 426
F.2d 1243, 73 1...R.R.M. 2871 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 951) (1970); Food Store
Employees v. NLRB (Heck's Inc.), 433 F.2d 541, 74 L.R.R.M. 2109 (D.C. Cir. 1971));
Retail Clerks v. NLRB (Zinke's Foods), 463 F.2d 316, 79 L.R.R.M. 2984 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
1 " E.g., Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1234, 79 L.R.R.M. 1175,
1177 (1972), modified and rehearing denied, 502 F.2d 349, 86 L.R.R.M. 2093 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Heck's Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 886, 888, 77
1...R.R.M, 1513, 1516 (1971); IP. Stevens & Co., 205 N.L.R.B, 1032, 1032-33, 84
L.R.R.M. 1092, 1093 (1973).
"T H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8, 123 CON(:. REC. 1110676-77, H 10702-
06 (daily eds. Oct. 5-6, 1977); S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2c1 Sess. § 9, 124 CoN;. REC. 57527
(daily ed. May 16, 1978). The full text of the make-whole provisions of H.R. 8410 and
S. 2467 may he found at Kramer„vupm this issue, note 117.
" 8 Id. The award would not be premised on the parties reaching an agreement
nor would it constitute an agreement between the parties. Instead, the payment by the
employer would compensate solely bier the period of illegal delay. Once bargaining in
good faith commenced, the parties could freely write their own contract.
"" Kramer, supra this issue, text at note 126.
"" Kramer, supra this issue, text at. note 127.
" 1 See text at notes 172-77 iq'm.
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Paper Co.' 72 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine in Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., "3 stating that "[tjhe most elementary conceptions of justice
and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncer-
tainty which his own wrong has created." 174
In International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB
(Tiidee Products),' 75 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia recognized the applicability of this fundamental principle to the for-
mulation of remedies under the National Labor Relations Act, holding that:
A tribunal given the function of implementing national policy
through compensatory remedies may not soundly refer to the diffi-
culty in quantifying appropriate compensation as a justification for
withdrawal and frustration of the policy, particularly where such an
approach would operate only to reward the wrongdoer and to give
him an advantage over a law-abiding competitor. 176
In so holding, the court relied upon the Supreme Court's statement of the
doctrine in Bigelow.' 77 Thus, a make-whole remedy for a section 8(a)(5) viola-
172 282 U.S. 555, 565 (1931).
17 :4 327 U.S. 251 (1946). In its recitation of the principal rule in Bigelow, id. at
264-65, the Supreme Court cited with approval the decision in F.W. Woolworth Co. v.
NLRB, 121 F.2d 658, 8 L.R.R.M. 515 (2d Cir. 1941), where the Second Circuit upheld
the Board's distribution of back pay among a large group of employees when it could
not identify the specific employees entitled to recompense. 121 F.2d at 663, 8
L.R.R.M. 519.
174
 327 U.S. at 265. The Court maintained that this principle was
an ancient one, Armory v. Delamirie, I Strange 505, and is not restricted to
proof of damage in anti-trust suits, although their character is such as fre-
quently to call for its application. In cases of collision where the offending
vessel has violated regulations prescribed by statute, see The Pennsylvania,
19 Wall. 125, 136, and in cases of confusion of goods, Great Southern Gas &
Oil Co. v. Logan Natural Gas & Fuel Co., 155 F.2d 114, 115; cf. F.W. Wool-
worth Co. v. Labor Board, 121 F.2d 658, 663, the wrongdoer may not object
to the plaintiff's reasonable estimate of the cause of injury and of its
amount, supported by the evidence, because not based on more accurate
data which the wrongdoer's misconduct has rendered unavailable. And in
cases where a wrongdoer has incorporated the subject of a plaintiff's pat-
ent or trade-mark in a single product to which the defendant has contrib-
uted other elements of value or utility, and has derived profits from the
sale of the product, this Court has sustained recovery of the full amount of
defendant's profits where his own wrongful action has made it impossible
for the plaintiff to show in what proportions he and the defendant have,
contributed to the profits. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Mfg.
Co., 225 U.S. 604; Hamilton Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers, 240 U.S. 251; see also
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 406.
327 U.S. at 265.
175 426 F.2d 1243, 73 L.R.R.M. 287{) (D.C. Cir. 1970).
' 7 " Id. at 1251, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2875. See also Buncher Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 340, 65
L.R.R.M. 1139 (1967) and American Fire Apparatus Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1318, 63
L.R.R.M. 1151 (1966), enlirced, 380 F.2d 1005, 65 L.R.R.M. 3082 (8th Cir. 1967).
177 The Tiidee court stated:
[Elven where the defendant by his own wrong has prevented a more
precise computation, the jury may not render a verdict based on specula-
tion or guesswork. But the jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of
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tion is entirely consistent with longstanding, judicially approved methods for
computing liability and restoring the status quo. As noted, such a remedy
clearly is necessary to make meaningful the right of employees to bargain
collectively through representatives of their choosing.
Furthermore, I cannot accept Mr. Kramer's second criticism—that a
make-whole remedy would set a floor for future negotiations. An employer
would not be obligated to provide the make-whole amount in negotiations.
Section 8(a)(5) only obligates an employer to bargain in good faith. If an
employer does so, he is free to negotiate any level of wages whatsoever.
Finally, Mr. Kramer suggests that it is unjustifiable to enforce a make-
whole remedy in cases where the employer's refusal to bargain is not based on
a bad faith effort to delay recognition of the union and negotiation of a con-
tract, but is instead a "technical" violation which the employer must commit so
as to gain review of a Board certification order believed by the employer to be
erroneous.'" This objection is not sound. In my experience, the sad reality
is that the vast majority of refusals to bargain fall in the category of bad faith
stalling tactics rather than in the category of good faith efforts to obtain re-
view of a certification order. Given the imprecision inherent in any good
faith/bad faith distinction, a rule designed to exempt employers from make-
whole liability in the small number of "good faith" cases would inevitably re-
sult, in practice, in denying the remedy in many of the far more numerous
"bad faith" cases as well.
But even in a case where an employer's refusal to bargain is in fact based
solely on a desire to obtain review of a certification which an employer
reasonably believes to be erroneous, if a court ultimately determines that the
employer's belief was mistaken, the consequences should fall on the employer,
not on the employees and the union. This is true for two reasons. First, it is
simply more equitable to place the risks attendant to a delay in bargaining on
the employer who causes the delay by choosing to litigate, rather than to place
those risks on the employees and the union who stand ready to bargain as
called for by the Board certification, the issuance of which may itself have
been long delayed. There is certainly nothing strange in the notion that a
party who chooses to litigate the validity of an administrative order rather
than to abide by the order must accept the risks of losing.'" That principle
the damage based on relevant data, and render its verdict accordingly....
Any other rule would enable the wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at
,the expense of his victim. It would be an inducement to make wrongdoing
so effective and complete in every case as to preclude any recovery, by
rendering the measure of damages uncertain. Failure to apply it would
mean that the more grievous the wrong done, the less likelihood there
would be of a recovery.
426 F.2d at 1251, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2875-76 (quoting Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264-65).
' 78 Kramer, supra this issue, text at notes 120-22. Direct review of Board certifi-
cation orders is not available, and consequently the primary route by which employers
may obtain review of a certification is to challenge the certification in defending - a
refusal to bargain charge. See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476-77 (1964);
American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409 (1940).
"9 See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 618 (1966); cl:
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 431-43 (1944).
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is particularly applicable here, since the Supreme Court has noted that Con-
gress deliberately chose to give Board certification orders immediate effect,
and to allow employers to challenge such orders only by defending unfair
labor practice cases, precisely because Congress did not want to subject unions
to "the risk of impairment of strength by attrition and delay" which would
result from permitting employers to delay effectuation of a certification order
by pursuing direct review."'"
The second reason why it is not unjust to place the risk of a make-whole
remedy on an employer who seeks to challenge a certification is that under
the formula which has been proposed, the make-whole remedy does not exact
a penalty from the employer, but merely requires him to provide wages and
benefits in an amount which is in the range of what he would likely have
provided had bargaining taken place. This is certainly not an unfair risk.
Thus, there is no reason to exempt "good faith" refusals to bargain from the
reach of a make-whole remedy.
CONCLUSION
The basic principles declared in the Wagner Act more than 40 years ago
need no revision. The national policy must he today, as Congress then de-
clared it to be. one of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and ... protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of as-
sociation, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their on
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection. "'"' What is needed today is
a mechanism by which those policies may be brought fully to life. The recent
labor reform bills would have taken reasonable steps in that. direction.
"" Boirc v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 477-79 (1964).
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